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One of the main causes behind the trade collapse of 2008-09 was a significant fall in the 
demand for durable goods. This paper develops a small country, overlapping generations 
model  of  international  trade  in  which  goods  durability  gives  rise  to  a  more  than 
proportional fall in trade volumes, as observed in 2008-09. The model has three goods - 
two  durable,  traded  goods  and  one  non-durable,  non-traded  good  and  two  factors  of 
production. The durability of goods affects consumers’ lifetime wealth and their optimal 
consumption bundle across goods and time periods. A uniform productivity shock reduces 
consumers’ lifetime wealth inducing a re-optimisation away from durables. This gives rise 
to a more than proportional effect on international trade, provided the non-traded sector is 
sufficiently capital intensive. The elasticity of trade flows to GDP is found to be increasing 
in both the degree of durability and the size of the shock. Thus the model provides micro-
foundations  for  the  asymmetric  shock  to  the  demand  for  durable  goods  observed  in 
recessions  and  clarifies  the  link  between  this  endogenous  shift  in  preferences  and 
international  trade  flows.  It  also  explains  the  observation  that  deeper  downturns  are 
associated with a higher elasticity of trade to GDP. Furthermore, the greater the degree of 
durability  of  traded  goods,  the  larger  is  the  share  of  domestically  produced  goods  in 
consumption, for plausible factor intensities. This provides an alternative explanation for 
the home bias in consumption, and hence another explanation for Trefler's "missing trade ". 
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and omissions. 1 Introduction
The global ￿nancial crisis of 2008-09 led to a period of recession and slow economic growth in
almost every developed economy. At the same time, there was a signi￿cant decline in global trade
volumes in real terms. From an average growth rate of 7.4 percent per year between 2003 and 2007,
export volumes grew by only 2.2 percent in 2008, and fell by 12.2 percent in 2009. However, exports
bounced back by growing by 14.5 percent in 2010 (all ￿gures from the World Trade Organisation
(WTO)). The trade collapse in 2009 and recovery in 2010 represent the largest percentage changes
in trade volumes since the WTO data series began in 1950. In addition, the collapse and recovery
of trade volumes is much larger than the comparable fall and rise of world GDP, which grew at 1.6
percent in 2008, decreased by 2.3 percent in 2009, and grew by 3.6 percent in 2010. Figure 1 shows
the growth rates of GDP and international trade from 2000 to 2010.
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The observation that trade ￿ uctuates more than GDP is not unique to the 2008-09 recession.
Freund (2009) shows that the elasticity of trade volumes to world GDP has increased from about 2
in the 1960s to over 3 after 1990. In addition, she ￿nds, based on evidence from the previous global
2downturns in 1975, 1982, 1991 and 2001, that the trade elasticity is higher in global downturns, so
that a global deceleration of 4.8 percent corresponds to a fall in international trade of 19 percent.
Similarly, Engel and Wang (2009) show that international trade is about three times as volatile
as GDP. This phenomenon can be seen in Figure 1: in 2008 and 2009, when world GDP growth
slowed down, the trade response was much larger than the decrease in GDP growth. Similarly,
when world GDP recovered in 2010, the recovery of trade ￿ ows was much larger than the recovery
in GDP.
The reasons for the collapse and recovery of international trade in 2009 and 2010 are mani-
fold. The essays in Baldwin (2009) and Baldwin and Evenett (2009) discuss the key explanations
proposed. Since the start of the trade collapse, several empirical papers have emerged seeking to
explain the causes of the more-than-proportional collapse in trade volumes. Levchenko et al (2010)
compare the contributions of three popular alternative explanations of the trade collapse: vertical
production linkages, trade credit, and compositional e⁄ects on durables demand. They conclude
that the patterns of the trade collapse are consistent with vertical production linkages and durables
demand playing important roles, while they did not detect any impact of trade credit1.
Similarly, to unpack the determinants of the trade collapse, Eaton et al (2011) develop a multi-
sector model of production and trade, calibrated to global data from recent quarters. They consider
four exogenous shocks to the model: a shock to ￿nal demand, a shock to trade frictions, a productiv-
ity shock, and a shock to trade de￿cits. They ￿nd that shocks to manufacturing demand, especially
for durable goods, account for the bulk of the decline in international trade. This is similar to the
result in Bems et al (2010), who ￿nd that ￿nal demand shocks can explain 70 percent of the trade
collapse, and that a big part of the impact of the demand shock occurs through durables. Behrens
et al (2010) using a dataset of Belgian ￿rms ￿nd that the fall in global demand explains over half
of the fall in exports in 2008-09, and that trade in consumer durables and capital goods fell more
severely than trade in other product categories. On the theoretical side, Engel and Wang (2009)
develop an international Real Business Cycle (RBC) model incorporating durable goods that is
calibrated to observed characteristics of international trade, showing the importance of durables
1However, other work such as Chor and Manova (2011) suggest that credit conditions were an important channel
in reducing trade volumes during the crisis. Amiti and Weinstein (2009) show that the health of a bank providing
trade ￿nance in￿ uences the growth in a ￿rm￿ s exports. Alessandria et al (2010) show that in the 2008-09 trade
collapse, industries with larger inventory adjustments experienced larger trade collapses.
3trade in open economy macro models2.
In this paper we develop an overlapping generations model of international trade to capture the
role of product durability in the trade collapse of 2009 and recovery of 2010. The model is of a
small country with three goods ￿two durable, traded goods and one non-durable, non-traded good,
all produced with constant returns to scale technologies using two factors of production, capital
and labour. The small country assumption implies that prices are exogenously determined, and
makes the model tractable. Empirically, Hall (2010b) and Levchenko et al (2010) show that prices
were much more sticky in the 2008 recession than quantities. The assumption that traded goods
are durable whilst non-traded goods are non-durable is strong, but has empirical support from De
Gregorio et al (1994), Engel and Wang (2008) and Erceg et al (2008), who show that durables are a
much larger share of international trade than they are of the domestic economy (according to Erceg
et al (2008), consumer durables and capital goods constitute about three-quarters of US non-fuel
imports and exports, but only 20 percent of the production share of the economy). Comparative
advantage determines which of the two durable goods the country exports.
A one-period, unanticipated uniform productivity shock is introduced and the model re-solved
for the presence of the shock, as well as during recovery from the shock. The unanticipated nature
of the shock may appear to be a strong assumption; however, the IMF￿ s World Economic Outlook
as late as October 2008 predicted world economic growth in 2009 to be 3.0 percent (IMF, 2008),
well above the actual growth rate of -0.5 percent, suggesting that even the best forecasters were
unable to anticipate the magnitude of the shock that hit the global economy. We show that product
durability causes the shock to give rise to a more than proportional decline in trade ￿ ows, consistent
with Figure 1. Moreover, trade ￿ ows are found to overshoot their long run level in the period after
the shock.
Goods durability a⁄ects the consumer￿ s lifetime wealth and the optimal consumption bundle
across goods and time periods. A uniform productivity shock reduces the consumer￿ s lifetime wealth
and hence has a disproportionate e⁄ect on his demand for durable goods. In this way the model
provides microfoundations for the asymmetric shock to the demand for durable goods identi￿ed
by Levchenko et al (2010), Engel and Wang (2009), and Eaton et al (2011). This endogenous
2The fall in GDP during the recession of 2008-09 has been associated with a greater-than-proportional decrease
in the demand for consumer durables and business investment; see Hall (2010a) and Wang (2010).
4asymmetry arises precisely from the durability of these goods. Moreover, the elasticity of trade
￿ ows to GDP is shown to be increasing in both the degree of durability and the size of the shock. The
model therefore provides an explanation for the observation that deeper downturns are associated
with a higher elasticity of trade to GDP.
Furthermore, traded goods durability means that a country consumes a larger share of domestically-
produced goods than would be predicted by the parameters of the utility function, thus providing an
alternative explanation for the home bias in consumption (Krugman, 1980), and hence potentially
another explanation for Tre￿ er￿ s missing trade (Tre￿ er, 1995; see also Chung, 2003).
The next section outlines the model. Section 3 analyses the impact of productivity shocks,
while Section 4 provides some concluding comments.
2 The model
Consider a small, open economy in which there are three goods: two traded, durable goods, X and
Y , and one non-traded, non-durable good, N. There is an in￿nite time horizon and in each period,
￿, goods j = fX;Y;Ng are produced with Cobb-Douglas technologies using labour, Lj and capital,












where ￿;￿;￿ 2 (0;1) and productivity parameter ￿ is positive and assumed identical across sectors
for simplicity. Let ￿ > ￿ such that of the traded goods, Y is relatively capital intensive4. We
assume the prices of the traded goods, denoted by PX and PY , respectively, are quoted on world
markets. Let PY = 1 (the numeraire) and PX = p. Further, L and K denote the economy￿ s
endowment of labour and capital, where these are supplied inelastically and always fully employed.
Suppose the economy is relatively capital abundant so good Y is exported and X imported, while
3Time subscripts are suppressed here to simplify the exposition of the model.
4The value of ￿ relative to ￿ and ￿ is important to the results of the model and is discussed in section 2.2.
5parameter values are such that there is incomplete specialisation.


























where Kj and Lj denote capital and labour employed in sector j, w is the wage rate and r the
rental rate. The factor market clearing conditions can be expressed as
aLXX + aLY Y + aLNN = L (7)
aKXX + aKY Y + aKNN = K, (8)
where ￿i;j denotes the unit factor requirement of input i into good j. The unit factor requirements


























































Assuming perfect competition it follows that price equals unit cost in each sector, such that
6aLXw + aKXr = p (12)
aLY w + aKY r = 1 (13)
aLNw + aKNr = PN. (14)
Factor prices and the price of the non-traded good can be determined in terms of p and tech-
nological parameters from equations (9) to (14), and can be expressed as
w = ￿
h


































￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(1￿￿) . (17)
Moreover, national income, denoted by M, is the sum of all factor income:
M = wL + rK. (18)
To model the impact of durability of goods on consumption decisions and international trade
we assume that generations of consumers live for two time periods, denoted by 1 and 2. Consumers
own labour and capital, which they supply inelastically in both time periods. Generations are
overlapping such that in any ￿ half of consumers are in period 1 of their life i.e. are ￿ young￿ ,
while the rest are in period 2, i.e. are ￿ old￿ . In fact, let there be one young consumer and one old












where ￿ > 1 is the subjective discount factor and ut denotes the consumers￿instantaneous utility
function







where ￿ 2 (0;1) and Cj;t is consumption of good j in period t of the consumer￿ s life. In period t of
their lives, each consumer earns an income mt, which is half of national income, and are assumed











Traded goods X and Y are durable, such that a fraction d = (1 ￿ ￿) of durable purchases by
a consumer in period 1 endure and can be enjoyed in consumption in period 2, where ￿ 2 [0;1]
denotes the common depreciation rate of durables between periods 1 and 2. Paremeter d therefore
re￿ ects the degree of durability of goods X and Y . Durable goods do not last beyond two periods
and, to simplify the analysis, there are no bequests of durable purchases made in year 2 and no
second hand market for durables.
Let us distinguish between consumption of durables CX;t and purchases of durables DX;t. Period
1 consumption of durables is exactly equal to purchases made as there are no bequests, while
consumption of durables in period 2 comprises the depreciated stock of durables from period 1 as
well as additional purchases in period 2. Since good N is not durable, consumption is equal to
purchases in both periods. The relationships between consumption and purchases are summarised
by
CX;1 = DX;1 ; CX;2 = dCX;1 + DX;2 (22)
CY;1 = DY;1 ; CY;2 = dCY;1 + DY;2 (23)
CN;1 = DN;1 ; CN;2 = DN;2. (24)
8Thus consumers chooses CN;1, CX;1, CY;1, CN;2, DX;2 and DY;2 to maximise

















subject to income constraints
PNCN;1 + pCX;1 + CY;1 ￿ m1 (26)
PNCN;2 + pDX;2 + DY;2 ￿ m2. (27)
Aggregate demand for good j across both consumers is denoted by Cj. Further, we impose the
constraint that demand for non-traded goods equals domestic supply,
CN = N. (28)
Let XY denote exports of good Y and MX denote imports of X, where
XY = Y ￿ CY (29)
MX = CX ￿ X, (30)
and trade balances, so
pMX = XY . (31)
2.1 Equilbrium without durability
As a benchmark we outline the equilibrium if all goods are non-durable and so cannot be consumed
beyond the period in which they are purchased. Since consumers cannot accumulate wealth in the
form of durable goods when d = 0 and are unable to borrow or lend, there is no link between time
9periods in the benchmark case. The ￿rst order conditions that follow from maximising (25) subject
to (26) and (27), setting d = 0, give the standard result that consumers allocate their income across
goods in ￿xed proportions, according to the preference parameter ￿:
PNCN;t = ￿mt (32)




Aggregate expenditure on each good can be expressed as
PNCN = ￿M (34)




which combined with equations (7)-(11), (15)-(18) and (28)-(31), allow us to solve for equilibrium
trade ￿ ows in each period,
pMX = XY =
￿
















Since w and r are proportional to total factor productivity ￿, then it follows that trade ￿ ows
are also proportional to ￿ in the non-durable case. Proposition 1 follows directly.
Proposition 1 If all goods are non-durable (d = 0), then a fall in productivity gives rise to a
proportional change in trade ￿ows.
Proof. Follows directly from equations (36) and (15)-(16).
2.2 Equilibrium with traded good durability
Now let traded goods have a degree of durability, d > 0. The ￿rst order conditions of the consumer￿ s
optimisation problem are given by equations (37) to (44), where ￿ and ￿ are the lagrangean
multipliers for budget constraints (26) and (27), respectively.
10￿
CN;1




































￿ ￿ = 0 (42)
PNCN;1 + pCX;1 + CY;1 ￿ m1 = 0 (43)
PNCN;2 + pDX;2 + DY;2 ￿ m2 = 0 (44)
It follows from the ￿rst order conditions that
pCX;2 = CY;2 =
1 ￿ ￿
2
(m2 + dpCX;1 + dCY;1) (45)
PNCN;2 = ￿ (m2 + dpCX;1 + dCY;1) (46)





m1 ￿ pCX;1 ￿ CY;1
+
d￿






m1 ￿ pCX;1 ￿ CY;1
+
d￿
2(m2 + dpCX;1 + dCY;1)
= 0. (48)
The durability of goods provides consumers with a means of building period 2 wealth through
the purchase of durables, which allows higher period 2 consumption of all goods. Equations (45) and
(46) show that in period 2 consumers￿expenditure on goods is in ￿xed proportions of their wealth,
in accordance with the preference parameter. The durability of goods X and Y generates a tradeo⁄
between period 1 and period 2 utility, such that the consumers￿optimal period 1 expenditure on
11each durable good exceeds
1￿￿
2 m1. By skewing consumption towards durable goods when young,
consumers can expect to achieve higher lifetime utility through the wealth e⁄ect.
In the absence of any productivity shocks, income is constant over consumers￿ lifetime, so
m1 = m2 = M
2 ￿ m. Solving (47) and (48) yields




PNCN;1 = (1 ￿ 2f (￿;d;￿))m < ￿m (50)
where f￿ (￿) < 0, fd (￿) > 0, f￿ (￿) > 0,
so consumers￿period 1 expenditure on each durable good is a share5 f (￿;d;￿) of income. Homo-
theticity of the utility function implies period 1 expenditure on each good is a constant share of
income, but the share spent on durables is greater than when d = 0. Furthermore, f (￿;d;￿) is
decreasing in ￿ and increasing in d and ￿. Intuitively, the greater the underlying preference for
durable goods, then the greater the income share spent on durables in period 1. Furthermore,
the greater the degree of durability, the greater the wealth e⁄ect and so the greater the incentive
to skew consumption towards durables. Also, the greater is ￿, the more patient are consumers
and thus the greater their willingness to sacri￿ce period 1 utility to build weath for period 2. If,
however, ￿ = 0, the incentive to trade-o⁄ utility over periods 1 and 2 disappears and f (￿;d;0)
collapses to
1￿￿
2 . Consider an example where ￿ = 0:95 and ￿ = 0:5; if d = 0:5, then it follows that
CY;1 = pCX;1 = 0:27312m > 0:25m.
Equations (45), (46) and (49) allows us to express period 2 expenditure as










PNCN;2 = ￿ (1 + 2df (￿;d;￿))m > ￿m. (52)
























for d > 0.
12purchases are declining in d. The (discounted) stock of durables from period 1 implies a lower
demand for durables in period 2, even though total consumption of durables is a constant share
(1 ￿ ￿) of period 2 wealth.
It follows from equations (49) to (52) that aggregate expenditure on durables and non-durables
can be expressed as
pCX = CY =






PNCN = b ￿ (￿;d;￿)M > ￿M (54)
where b ￿ (￿;d;￿) =
1+￿
2 ￿ f (￿;d;￿)(1 ￿ ￿d) and b ￿￿ (￿) > 0, b ￿d (￿) > 0 and b ￿￿ (￿) > 0. That is,
aggregate demand for traded durables is lower in equilibrium than if X and Y were non-durable.
The aggregate share of income spent on durables is decreasing in d, and vice versa for non-durables.
In fact, demand in the economy with durability d > 0 and preference parameter ￿ is identical to
when d = 0 and the preference parameter is b ￿. In other words, durability of goods in the model
endogenously shifts consumption away from durable goods in the aggregate, as if ￿ were higher.
For example, if ￿ = 0:5;￿ = 0:95 and d = 0:54337, then PNCN = 0:55M. Proposition 2 summarises
the results of thus far.
Proposition 2 The larger the degree of durability, d, then:
(i) the larger is the equilibrium share of income spent on durables by the young,
(ii) the smaller is the equilibrium share of income spent on durables by the old,
(iii) the smaller is the aggregate share of national income spent on durable goods:
Proof. Follows from equations (49) to (54) and f (￿;d;￿) = 1
2d(2+￿)￿
￿









It follows from equations (53) and (54) and Proposition 2 that the impact of durability on
equilibrium trade ￿ ows is the same as that from increasing the preference parameter from ￿ to b ￿.
Flam (1985) shows in a generalised model with two traded goods and one non-traded good that
the impact on the trade share of an increased preference for the non-traded good depends on the














the implications of which are summarised by condition 1.
Condition 1 If ￿ + ￿ ￿ 2￿ < 0, then trade ￿ows are decreasing in the degree of durability, d.
Proof. The result follows directly from Proposition 2 and equation (55).
Condition 1 states that an increase in traded good durability lowers trade ￿ ows through the
impact of d on b ￿ (￿;d;￿), provided the non-traded sector is not too labour intensive relative to
the two traded sectors. The shift in aggregate demand towards the non￿ durable, non-traded good
induces an expansion of domestic production N. If good N were very labour intensive, e.g. if
￿ > ￿ > ￿, then a relatively large quantity of labour would need to be employed to generate this
production increase, leaving the residual composition of available resources more capital abundant.
This in turn would necessitate an expansion of Y and contraction of X for factor markets to clear,
increasing trade ￿ ows.
How plausible is it that Condition 1 is satis￿ed? Non-traded goods are largely services, which
would include transportation, electricity and telecommunications. Though services are conventially
perceived as being labour intensive, some services such as electricity generation are arguably more
capital intensive than some imports from developing countries. It is therefore plausible that im-
ported manufactures can be less capital intensive than some non-traded services. Indeed, Cardi and
Restout (2011) document that, across 13 OECD countries from 1970 to 2004, the capital share in
the output of non-traded goods is similar to that in traded goods, and in some cases even exceeds
the latter.
Consider an example where d = 0, ￿ = 1
3, ￿ = 2
3, ￿ = 3
5, ￿ = 1
2, ￿ = 0:95, p = ￿ = 1, K = 900
and L = 600. Substituting into equations (15), (16) and then (36) gives the value of exports (and
imports) at 75 ￿ 2
2
3. If durability rises to d = 0:54337, then b ￿ = 0:55, which lowers the value of
exports to 67:5 ￿ 2
2
3.
If condition 1 is satis￿ed, then the ￿ndings of the model point to an endogenous home bias
in consumption arising from product durability and suggest a new explanation for Tre￿ er￿ s (1995)
14￿missing trade ￿ . Greater durability lowers trade ￿ ows, thereby expanding the share of domestically
produced goods in consumption. The model shows that even with constant returns to scale tech-
nologies and homothetic preferences, a home bias can be generated without appealing to transport
costs.
Corollary 1 If ￿+￿￿2￿ < 0 and d > 0, there is a home bias in consumption, which is increasing
in d:
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 2 and condition 1.
3 Trade e⁄ects of a productivity shock with durability
This section examines the impact of an unanticipated, uniform total factor productivity shock, for
a single time period, on consumption decisions and trade ￿ ows, both in the period of the shock and
in subsequent periods.The pattern of consumption and trade ￿ ows are compared to the equilibrium
of section 2.2, which we refer to as the ￿ steady state￿ . In what follows superscripts denote the period
in which the consumption takes place, while the digit subscript denotes whether the consumer is
young or old in that period.
3.1 Trade ￿ ows in the shock period
Let T denote the shock period in which ￿ falls to ￿￿, where ￿ 2 (0;1): From equations (15), (16)
and (17) it follows the fall in productivity, uniform across all sectors, lowers equilibrium factor
prices w and r by the same proportion, but leaves PN unchanged. National income thus falls to
￿M in period T and mT = ￿m. The shock is unanticipated so ET￿1 (mT) = m and percieved
temporary, so ET (mT+1) = m.
The old consumer in period T has a (depreciated) stock of durables from T ￿1, purchased with
the expectation that period 2 income would also be m. Consumption of the old consumer in T is






















X;1 = f (￿;d;￿)m. Substituting for T ￿ 1 consumption levels and subtracting
dCT￿1
Y;1 from pCT



















￿m > ￿PNCN;2. (59)
Let b ￿(￿;d;￿) denote the threshold value6 of ￿ below which durable purchases of the old consumer
fall to zero in the shock period. Assume b ￿(￿;d;￿) < ￿ < 1 so pDT
X;2 = DT
Y;2 > 0. Equations (58)
and (59) imply that the fall in demand for durables by the old generation is more than proportional
to the productivity shock, due to carrying a relatively large stock of durables from T ￿ 1.
Furthermore, from equations (47) and (48) it follows that consumption of durables by the young


































￿ = 0. (61)
Solving (60) and (61) gives
6b ￿(￿;d;￿) is increasing in d and ￿ and decreasing in ￿, since these raise and lower the consumer￿ s period 1 durable
consumption, respectively, through f (￿;d;￿). For example, if ￿ = 0:95, ￿ = 0:5 and d = 0:54337; then from f (￿;d;￿)
and equation (58) it follows that b ￿ = 0:29843.
16CT
Y;1 = pCT
X;1 = g (￿;d;￿;￿)￿m < ￿CY;1 = ￿pCX;1 (62)
PNCT
N;1 = (1 ￿ 2g (￿;d;￿;￿))￿m > ￿PNCN;1 (63)
where g￿ (￿) < 0, gd (￿) > 0, g￿ (￿) > 0 and g￿ (￿) > 0,
so expenditure on each durable good by the young consumer is a share7 g (￿;d;￿;￿) of income.
The fall in demand for durables by the young generation is also more than proportional to the
productivity shock. This arises because income is uneven over the consumer￿ s lifetime. A lower
period 1 income reduces the incentive to skew consumption towards durables in period 1, as the
sacri￿ce in period 1 utility from doing so is larger.
Aggregating over the consumers gives national expenditure on each good in period T as a
proportion of national income8,
pCX;T = CY;T =
1 ￿ b ￿T (￿;d;￿;￿)
2
￿M <
1 ￿ b ￿ (￿;d;￿)
2
￿M (64)
PNCN;T = b ￿T (￿;d;￿;￿)￿M > b ￿ (￿;d;￿)￿M, (65)
where b ￿T (￿;d;￿;￿) =
1+￿
2 ￿ g (￿;d;￿;￿) +
￿df(￿;d;￿)
￿ and is increasing in ￿;d;￿ and decreasing in
￿. Since both young and old optimise away from durables, it follows that for given d, a shock ￿
induces a smaller fraction of national income ￿M to be spent on durables.
If ￿ + ￿ ￿ 2￿ < 0, then the rise in b ￿ induced by the productivity shock, induces a more than






























for d > 0.





(1 ￿ b ￿T)(1 ￿ ￿) + b ￿T (1 ￿ ￿)
(￿ ￿ ￿)
+






(1 ￿ b ￿T)￿ + b ￿T￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ b ￿T
2
￿
wL < ￿pMX = ￿XY
Trade ￿ ows are thus scaled down by ￿, then lowered further by the preference shift from b ￿ to
b ￿T (￿;d;￿;￿). The ￿ndings are summarised in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If ￿ + ￿ ￿ 2￿ < 0 and d > 0, then an unanticipated fall in productivity for one
period gives rise to a more than proportional decline in trade ￿ows in that period.
Proof. This follows from equations (58) to (66) and condition 1.
For example, let us return to the setting where ￿ = 1
3, ￿ = 2
3, ￿ = 3
5, ￿ = 1
2, d = 0:54337,
￿ = 0:95, p = ￿ = 1, K = 900 and L = 600, for which b ￿ = 0:55 and the value of exports is 67:5￿2
2
3.
If productivity falls to ￿￿ in T; then b ￿T (￿) can be determined by substituting the parameters into
f (￿;d;￿), equation (58) and then g (￿;d;￿;￿). For ￿ = 0:5, then b ￿T (￿ = 0:5) = 0:63516, which
exceeds b ￿. Trade ￿ ows are computed from equation (66) to be 27:363￿2
2
3, lower than a proportional
decline in trade ￿ ows to 33:75 ￿ 2
2
3.
3.2 The elasticity of trade to the shock
A corollary of Proposition 3 is that the elasticity of trade to the shock exceeds 1, if ￿ +￿￿2￿ < 0
and d > 0. The elasticity of exports to the shock (and thus to GDP) follows from equation (66)















2rK ￿ [￿ + ￿ + b ￿T (2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)]
￿
rK + wL
￿ > 1, (67)
where "X;T is decreasing in ￿ and K and increasing in d, ￿, L, and ￿. The elasticity of trade to
GDP is thus greater the larger the degree of durability and the larger the shock. Returning to the
example where ￿ = 1
3, ￿ = 2
3, ￿ = 3
5, ￿ = 1
2, d = 0:54337, ￿ = 0:95, p = ￿ = 1, K = 900, L = 600
the elasticity is 1:46 if ￿ = 0:5, but rises to 1:62 if ￿ = 0:4. The model therefore describes
18a mechanism that explains the observation that deeper downturns are associated with a higher
elasticity of trade to GDP.
3.3 Trade ￿ ows after the shock
In T + 1, productivity is restored to ￿ and so the wage rate, rental rate and national income are
w, r, and M, respectively. The young consumer in period T + 1 expects constant income m over
his life, so demands goods according to equations (49) and (50). The old consumer, however, has a
stock of durables from T, given by equation (62), which are lower than in the steady state. With a
smaller stock of durables from period 1, the consumer￿ s period 2 expenditure on durable purchases
is higher than in the steady state. To see this, consider that in period T + 1 the older generation






















X;1 = g (￿;d;￿;￿)￿m. Substituting for T consumption levels and subtracting
dCT
Y;1 from pCT+1









m > DY;2 = pDX;2 (70)
PNCT+1
N;2 = ￿ (1 + 2￿dg (￿;d;￿;￿))m < PNCN;2. (71)
Hence, the old generation spends a larger share of income on durables than in the steady state,
while the young generation spends exactly the same share as in the steady. The aggregate e⁄ect is
that a larger proportion of national income is spent on durables in T than in the steady state,
pCX;T+1 = CY;T+1 =
1 ￿ b ￿T+1 (￿;d;￿;￿)
2
M >
1 ￿ b ￿ (￿;d;￿)
2
M (72)
PNCN;T+1 = b ￿T+1 (￿;d;￿;￿)M < b ￿ (￿;d;￿)M, (73)
19where b ￿T+1 (￿;d;￿;￿) =
1+￿
2 ￿ f (￿;d;￿) + ￿d￿g (￿;d;￿;￿) and is increasing in ￿;d;￿ and ￿. Fur-
thermore, if ￿ +￿ ￿2￿ < 0, then the increase to b ￿T+1 (￿;d;￿;￿) gives rise to a level of trade ￿ ows





1 ￿ b ￿T+1
￿
(1 ￿ ￿) + b ￿T+1 (1 ￿ ￿)
(￿ ￿ ￿)
+






1 ￿ b ￿T+1
￿
￿ + b ￿T+1￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ b ￿T+1
2
!
wL > pMX = XY
Finally, in period T +2, the equilibrum discussed in section 2.2 is restored, since all consumers
have income m in both periods of their life. The ￿ndings are summarised in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 If ￿+￿￿2￿ < 0 and d > 0, then trade ￿ows overshoot the steady state level before
returning to it in the two periods following an unanticipated, one period fall in productivity.
Proof. This follows from equations (70) to (74) and condition 1.
Returning to the example where ￿ = 1
3, ￿ = 2
3, ￿ = 3
5, ￿ = 1
2, d = 0:54337, ￿ = 0:95, p = ￿ = 1,
K = 900 and L = 600, we can determine b ￿T+1 (￿) by substituting the parameters into f (￿;d;￿),
g (￿;d;￿;￿), and equations (70) and (49). For ￿ = 0:5, b ￿T+1 = 0:51126, which is smaller than b ￿.
Trade ￿ ows are computed from equation (74) to be 73:311 ￿ 2
2
3, larger than steady state trade
￿ ows at 67:5 ￿ 2
2
3. Figure 2 summarises the e⁄ects of the shock on GDP and trade ￿ ows, for the
parameter values we have been using thus far.
4 Conclusions
There is systematic evidence that trade ￿ ows are more volatile than GDP, with the trade collapse
of 2008 a striking example of this. Moreover, the observed large decline in demand for durable
goods has been posited as key to explaining the trade collapse. While durable goods are commonly
incorporated into macro models, there is relatively limited analysis of the role of product durability
in the theoretical trade literature. Comparative advantage models characterised by homothetic
preferences and constant returns to scale technologies have the feature that trade ￿ ows change
in proportion with uniform productivity shocks. This paper shows that by embedding durability
20Figure 2: The time-path of trade and GDP in response to an unanticipated uniform productivity
shock in period T.
of traded goods into an otherwise standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework with two traded and one
non-traded, non-durable sector, it is possible to explain the excess trade volatility phenomenon,
both in the period of the national income shock and in the recovery phase.
Overlapping generations of consumers who generate future wealth through the purchase of
durables are shown to maximise life-time utility by skewing their consumption towards durables
when young. In turn, the stock of durables carried from the ￿rst year of life lowers demand for
durable goods when consumers are old. The aggregate e⁄ect is that durability of traded goods
endogenously shifts preferences away from traded goods towards non-traded goods in the economy.
Provided the non-durable sector is su¢ ciently capital intensive, embedding durability in the model
gives rise to an endogenous increase in the share of domestically produced goods in consumption.
The model thus o⁄ers an alternative explanation for the home bias phenomenon, as well as for
Tre￿ er￿ s ￿missing trade￿ , that does not hinge on the presence of transport costs or increasing
returns.
Shocking the equilibrium with a one period, unanticipated uniform decline in productivity
induces a re-optimisation away from durables by both young and old in the economy. For the young
it is due to a reduced willingness to trade-o⁄ utility in youth for utility in later life when period 1
income is shocked. For the old it is the large stock of durables carried forward from youth, which
21explains the fall in durable purchases. The aggregate e⁄ect is a more than proportional decline in
international trade, provided the non-traded sector is su¢ ciently capital intensive. Furthermore,
the elasticity of trade ￿ ows with respect to GDP is found to be increasing both in the degree of
durability and the size of the shock. Thus the model provides microfoundations for the asymmetric
shock to the demand for durable goods observed in recessions and clari￿es the link between this
endogenous shift in preferences and international trade ￿ ows. It also o⁄ers an explanation for the
observation that deeper downturns are associated with a higher elasticity of trade to GDP.
The model clearly has its limitations. While it o⁄ers one mechanism for understanding trade
volatility, it does not address other factors thought to have contributed to the trade collapse such
as vertical production linkages. Moreover, the emphasis is on demand for consumer durables, and
does not consider demand for capital goods. The small economy assumption makes the model
tractable, but limits the analysis to the e⁄ects of a domestic shock while prices are kept constant.
Furthermore, the only intertemporal link in the model is the stock of durable goods that are carried
forward; consumers are unable to borrow or lend. Examining how access to capital markets may
a⁄ect trade volatility is an interesting avenue for future research. Finally, the only determinant of
international trade considered is comparative advantage. An examination of trade models based on
economies of scale or with heterogeneous ￿rms may provide further mechanisms for understanding
the determinants of trade volatility.
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